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Introduction 
 
   On 16 December 2008, the ECJ, in delivering its ruling in the Cartesio case
1
, 
concerning a limited partnership incorporated in Hungary and seeking to transfer its seat 
to Italy while maintaining its legal status under Hungarian law, uphold – contrary to the 
Advocate General (AG) recommendation - a position expressed twenty years earlier in 
the Daily Mail case
2
. Notably, in Daily Mail the ECJ had stated that, at the current state 
of EC law, Article 48 of the Treaty could not be interpreted as conferring companies 
incorporated in a Member State the right to move their head office or registered office to 
another Member State (so called right of primary establishment) while retaining the legal 
status conferred by the law of the State of incorporation.    
   After Daily Mail, the ECJ had been delivering other landmark company law rulings 
concerning companies’ freedom of establishment within the European Community – in 
particular, the Centros
3
, the Uberseering
4
, the Inspire Art
5
, the SEVIC
6
 and the Cadbury 
Schweppers
7
 cases -  and this case-law has been triggering, in the academic community 
both within and outside the European Community, a very wide amount of contributions 
discussing the contents of the freedom of establishment granted to companies by Articles 
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty and its implications
8
. 
                                                 
(*) LLM, Ph.D, Law Lecturer, Brunel Law School, Brunel University 
1
 Case C 210/06 
2
 Case 81/87, Daily Mail ECR [1988] 5483 
3
 Case C 212/97, Centros ECR [1999] 1459 
4
 Case C 208/00, Uberseering ECR [2002] 9919  
5
 Case C 167/01,  Inspire Art ECR [2003] 10155 
6
 Case C 411/03, SEVIC Systems ECR [2005] 10805 
7
 Case C 196/04, Cadbury Schweppes ECR [2006] 7995 
8
 Amongst the extremely wide literature since the Daily Mail case, inter alia: Loussouarn, Y, “Le droit 
d’etablissement des societes”, Revue trimestrelle de droit europeen, 1990, 227-239; Tridimas, T. “The 
case-law of the Court of Justice on corporate entities”, Yearbook of European Law, 1994,  (13), 336- 360; 
Roussos, A. Realising the free movement of companies: European Business Law Review, 1(12) 2001,  pp. 
7-25; Andenas, M., “Free Movement of Companies”, Law Quarterly Review, 2003, pp. 119-226; Ballarino, 
T. “Sulla mobilita’ delle societa’ nella Comunita’ Europea. Da Daily Mail a Uberseering: norme 
imperative, norme di conflitto e liberta’ comunitarie”, Rivista delle societa’, 2003, pp. 723-764; Cerioni, L. 
“The Uberseering ruling: the Eve of a Revolution for the Possibilities of Companies’ Migration throughout 
the European Community? The Columbia Journal of European Law 2003, Vol. 10, pp. 117-137; Roth, W.-
H.. “From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private International Law and 
Community Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 52, pp.177-208; Wooldridge, 
F., “Freedom of Establishment of Companies Affirmed” , European Business Law Review 2003, Vol. 14, 
pp. 227-235; Gildea A.J. “Uberseering: A European Company Passport”, Brooklin International Law 
Journal, Vol. 30.1., 2004, p. 257-292; Kieninger, E.M., “Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Centros, 
Überseering und Inspire Art: Antworten, Zweifel und offene Fragen”, Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht (ZEuP) 2004, pp. 685-705;  Vaccaro, E. “Transfer of Seat and Freedom of Establishment in 
European Company Law”, European Business Law Review. 2005, Vol. 16 p. 1348-1365.    
    In the rulings issued after Daily Mail,  the ECJ had been taking a “liberal” stance in 
defining the contents of the freedom of establishment. In fact, it had clarified that: 
companies incorporated in any Member State may open a branch in another Member 
State and carry on even their entire business activity via this branch
9
;  the use of a more 
favourable company law legislation or tax legislation can be amongst the reasons driving 
the exercise of the right of establishment
10
; a Member State where a company registered 
in another has moved its central administration cannot refuse to recognise this company’s 
legal personality
11
. Against this background, the Cartesio ruling – due to the fact that it 
has denied companies the right under Art. 48 to move its central headquarter out of its 
Member State of incorporation while remaining subject to the law of this State –  is 
meeting strong criticism
12
. Nonetheless, as the ECJ’s  has distinguished the situation in 
Cartesio from a situation in which a company wishes to transfer its registered and real 
seat with the change of applicable national law, the ruling is bound to have, in this 
author’s view, far-reaching effects, which this paper aims at highlighting. 
   For this purpose, the first part delineates the background and the situation in Cartesio, 
and illustrates the A.G.’s reasoning, whereas the second part analysis the ECJ’s 
arguments. In light of this analysis, the third part stresses the possible implications for the 
future developments of EC company law.    
       
   1. The background and the AG reasoning 
 
     
  Within the European Community, Member States adopt different criteria for identifying 
the connection between a legal person and the legal system which is deemed to govern 
the creation and the functioning of the legal person itself. A group of Member States
13
 
has traditionally been following the “real seat” criteria, according to which a company is 
governed by the law of the Member State where its head office (real seat) is located.  This 
criteria generally requires the head office to be maintained in the same State as the 
registered office, so that the transfer of the head office to another State either results in 
the winding up of the company in the State of origin or is subject to certain conditions. 
Another group of Member States
14
 has been adopting the “incorporation system”, 
according to which the company is governed by the law of the country where it is 
registered; Member States adopting the incorporation system allow companies formed 
under their jurisdiction to move their head office abroad while still keeping the legal 
status as companies formed under national law.  
    In the case at stake Cartesio, a limited partnership formed in accordance with 
Hungarian law and thus registered in Hungary submitted an application to its local 
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commercial court to amend its registration in the local commercial register so as to 
record, as its new commercial headquarter, an address in Italy, while remaining registered 
in Hungary. The commercial court rejected the application, on the ground that Hungarian 
law did not offer companies the possibility of transferring their operational headquarters 
to another Member State while retaining their legal status as a company governed by 
Hungarian law. In consequence, to move its operational headquarter to Italy, Cartesio 
would first have to be dissolved in Hungary and then reconstituted in Italy.   
    When submitting its application for recording its new commercial headquarter in Italy 
to the Hungarian commercial court, Cartesio could certainly not foresee that the 
applicable Hungarian law, which at that time used to require the coincidence between the 
legal seat and the place of central management (i.e., the head office), would subsequently 
be amended and that no problem would have arisen had the new provision applied. In 
fact, new provisions introduced by the Hungarian legislature, which entered into force on 
1 September 2007, allow a business to transfer its head office to another Member State 
while remaining registered (and keeping its registered office) in Hungary
15
.   
    The competent Hungarian Court of Appeal, before which Cartesio brought an appeal 
against the decision of the commercial court, asked the ECJ, essentially, whether the 
transfer of seat of a company constituted under Hungarian law to another Member State 
is within the scope of EC law or whether, in the absence of harmonisation, national law is 
exclusively applicable, and whether Arts. 43 and 48 must be interpreted as meaning that 
national rules which prevent a Hungarian company from transferring its seat to another 
Member State of the EC are incompatible with EC law
16
.   
    It has been noted that, unfortunately, the case right from the beginning was “enveloped 
in the mist of confusion with regard to legal terminology”17. Whereas the Hungarian 
reference simply used the term “szekhely” (seat), thus apparently asking whether a 
simultaneous transfer of the statutory seat and of the head office was covered by the 
freedom of establishment provisions of the Treaty, the A.G. developed its reasoning by 
assuming that Cartesio wanted to transfer its “operational headquarter” (i.e., the head 
office) alone. Although the question dealt with by the AG was thus different from the one 
really at stake, the subsequent ECJ ruling – as it will be indicated18 – indirectly offered 
the response to the issue actually raised by the Hungarian court too.            
   The A.G. started its reasoning by assuming that Hungarian law was based on the so-
called “real seat criteria”19  and by submitting that the outbound transfer of seat does not 
fall outside the scope of the Treaty. He pointed out that national rules allowing a 
company to transfer its operational headquarter only within the national territory treat 
cross-border situations less favourably than purely domestic situations – just like the 
national rules regarded by the ECJ as incompatible with the freedom of establishment in 
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the rulings X and Y
20
, Lasteryrie du Saillant
21
, SEVIC Systems
22
 and Oy
23
 - and that 
amount to discrimination against the exercise of the freedom of movement
24
.  On the 
ground that Cartesio – by seeking to transfer its operational headquarter to Italy – 
proposed the “actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in 
another Member State for an indefinite period” according to the definition of genuine 
exercise of the freedom of establishment given by the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppers
25
, the 
AG argued that Treaty rules on the right of establishment clearly applied to the case
26
.  
   With this starting point for his reasoning, the A.G. submitted that the distinction made 
by the ECJ itself between the “moving out” situation in Daily Mail on the one hand, and 
the “moving in” situation in Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art on the other hand, 
never fitted the ECJ’s analytical framework for Articles 43 and 48, which framework, 
particularly in the SEVIC ruling, had been summarised by the ECJ itself as meaning that 
restrictions “on entering” or “on leaving” national territory are prohibited27. In the A.G. 
view, this distinction drawn by the ECJ between inbound establishment (allowed by 
Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art and SEVIC) and outbound establishment  (not allowed 
by Daily Mail) departed from the ECJ’s reasoning in Daily Mail itself: in making this 
argument, the A.G. referred to the ECJ’s statement in Daily Mail, identical to the one 
formulated in Baars
28
 and in Lasteyrie du Saillant, whereby the provisions on freedom of 
establishment “also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment 
in another Member State or of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its 
legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 58”29.   
   Consistently with these premises, the A.G. expressed the opinion, first, that the ECJ’s 
statement in Daily Mail, according to which the Treaty does not confer companies a right 
to transfer the head office to another Member State while retaining their status as 
companies incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State”30, does not 
represent the case-law and its underlying logic accurately
31
. This would be the case, 
according to the AG, both with regard to the possibility for companies of using the 
freedom of establishment – where he found that the Cadbury Schweppes ruling represents 
a significant qualification of the liberal rulings in Centros and Inspire Arts, due to the 
ECJ’s statement, in Cadbury Schweppes, that the right of establishment does not prevent 
Member States from being wary of “letter box”or “front companies” – and with regards 
to the effects that any segment of national rules or practices may have on the freedom of 
establishment.. On the realisation that the effective exercise of the freedom of 
establishment requires at least some degree of mutual recognition and coordination of the 
various systems of rules, the AG draw the conclusion that the case-law, while respecting 
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national rules regardless of whether they are based on the real seat or on the incorporation 
theory, implies that neither theory can be applied to the fullest logical extension
32
. In the 
AG view, Uberseering is  perhaps the best example of the fact that neither theory can be 
applied to the fullest logical extension
33
. In effect, in that case, involving a company 
incorporated in the Netherland which had been regarded as having transferred its central 
administration to Germany, the ECJ had ruled that the denial in Germany of the capacity 
of a company incorporated in the Netherlands to be a part of legal proceeding, unless the 
company were reconstituted under German law (which would have been the result of a 
full application of the real seat theory) was tantamount to an outright negation of the 
freedom of establishment, and could not be justified on grounds of general interest
34
.  
   Consequently, in the AG’s view, on the basis of the current state of EC law Member 
States do not enjoy an absolute freedom to determine “life and death” of companies 
constituted under their domestic law regardless of the effects on the freedom of 
establishment, on the ground that Member States would otherwise have total discretion to 
impose the winding up of a company just because the company had decided to exercise 
the freedom of establishment
35
. Having noted that Hungarian provisions applicable at the 
relevant time did not merely set out conditions for the transfer, but instead required that 
the company be dissolved, and that the Hungarian Government did not put forward any 
grounds for justification, the AG considered therefore the Hungarian provisions at issue 
as an outright negation of the freedom of establishment without justifications on public 
interests reasons. He thus recommended the ECJ to rule that Articles 43 and 48 preclude 
national rules which make it impossible for a company formed under national law to 
transfer its operational headquarters to another Member State
36
.  
    Because the AG, in his reasoning, had accepted that grounds of general public interests 
such as the protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees or 
the tax authorities may make it acceptable for a Member State to set certain conditions 
before a company formed under its national law could transfer its operational headquarter 
to another Member State, the AG conclusion could well have been different had the 
Hungarian provisions simply set specific requirements to be met before the transfer – 
rather than imposing the dissolution of the company – and had the Hungarian 
Government justified these requirements.                                 
    
 
2. The ECJ’s  arguments 
 
   The reason underlying the distinction, in the case of legal entities, between outbound 
seat transfer (the Daily Mail and Cartesio situation) and inbound seat transfer (the 
situation in Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art), which was found unconvincing by the 
AG, was implicitly explained by the ECJ through his statement, in Daily Mail, that 
“unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of law and, in the present state of 
Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying 
                                                 
32
 Opinion, point 29 
33
 Ibid 
34
 Case C-208/00, Uberseering, cit. para. 93.  
35
 Opinion, point 31 
36
 Opinion,  points 34 and 35 
national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning”37.   
   The realisation that companies are “creatures of national law”, as a reason for leaving 
national law the assessment whether a company still meets the conditions for its 
existence, seemingly faces the objection, in the AG opinion, that at the current state of 
Community law it is impossible for Member States to enjoy an absolute freedom to 
determine the “life and death” of companies.  However, if the ECJ statement under 
consideration (companies are “creatures of national law”) is taken together with another 
statement, in Daily Mail itself, whereby the freedom of establishment “also prohibits the 
Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one 
of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation which comes within the 
definition contained in Article 58” (currently, Article 48)38, the two statements could 
have been reconciled if interpreted in light of each other.  
     In fact, it could be inferred that, in the ECJ’s view, as long as companies continue to 
satisfy the conditions set by national legislation for their existence, the Member State of 
origin cannot prohibit companies from establishing operations in other Member States. 
From this viewpoint, no contradiction could be found between the conception of 
companies as creatures of national law and the Daily Mail conclusion on the one hand, 
and the ECJ’s statements whereby Member States of origin cannot hinder the 
establishment in other Member States, referred to by the AG, on the other hand. The 
contradiction could not be found because two different issues are at stake: what the 
existence of a company requires (the creation in accordance with national law); what 
rights the company enjoys under EC law once it exists under national law. A parallel 
could be drawn between the incorporation of companies (with the national law applicable 
to them) and the nationality of individuals: for natural persons too, the issue concerning 
the conditions under which an individual can be a national of a Member State (conditions 
which are established by each State) is conceptually different from the issue concerning 
which rights nationals of Member States enjoy under EC law.        
    The actual ECJ reasoning in Cartesio developed two key issues: whether companies 
created under the law of a Member State could move its real seat to another State while 
remaining governed by the law of the country of incorporation; the distinction between 
this situation and the situation of companies wishing to move to another Member State 
both the registered and the head office with a change of the applicable national law.  
  As regards the question whether companies created under the law of a Member State 
could move its real seat to another State while remaining governed by the law of the 
country of incorporation, the ECJ – in departing from the AG opinion – followed and 
developed exactly the line of the above arguments. In detail, the ECJ first highlighted its 
previous statements in Daily Mail and in Uberseering, to the effect that: a) the Treaty 
places on the same footing the different connecting factors required by Member States for 
the creation of companies governed by their own legislations in order to grant companies 
formed under the national law of any Member States the right of establishment
39
; b) the 
question whether a company formed in accordance with the law of one Member State can 
transfer its registered office or its real seat to another Member State without losing its 
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legal personality under the law of the Member State of incorporation, and the rules 
relating to that transfer, are determined by the national law in accordance with which the 
company was incorporated
40
. Based on these premises, and after stressing its statement in 
Daily Mail that the Treaty regards the differences in the legislations of Member States 
concerning the connecting factors for companies as problems which are not resolved by 
the rules concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt with by future legislation 
or convention, the ECJ draw a consistent conclusion.  
    The ECJ conclusion is that, in the absence of a uniform Community law definition of 
companies which may enjoy the right of establishment on the basis of a single connecting 
factor, it is for the applicable national law to solve the question whether Art. 43 applies to 
a company which seeks to rely on the right of establishment. This on the ground that a 
company is entitled to freedom of establishment so long as it maintains the connecting 
factor required for its existence under the national law of the Member State of 
incorporation
41
. The power of a Member State – concludes the ECJ – “includes therefore 
the possibility for that Member State not to permit a company governed by its law to 
retain that status if the company intends to reorganise itself in another State by moving its 
seat to the territory of the latter, thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the 
national law of the Member State of incorporation”42  
    Contrary to the AG opinion, the ECJ thus found that a Member State can still 
determine “life and death” of a company if the company wishes to retain its legal status 
under the law of that State whilst no longer complying with the conditions required to 
maintain the connecting factor. In essence, this part of the ECJ’s ruling echoes the Daily 
Mail conclusion. Before the Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art and SEVIC rulings were 
issued, the conclusion in Daily Mail had been regarded, by a part of the literature, as a 
refusal by the ECJ to recognise under EC law the right of primary establishment – in the 
absence of EC harmonisation measures or of a convention between Member States - due 
to a possible concern to prevent Arts. 43 and 48 of the Treaty from granting different 
rights to companies according to whether they were formed in Member States adopting 
the real seat criteria or the incorporation criteria
43
. Although in the Daily Mail case both 
the Member State of origin (the UK) and the intended Member State of destination (the 
Netherlands) adopted the incorporation system, it had been argued that, had the ECJ 
recognised Daily Mail the right under Art. 48 to move its head office to the Netherlands 
while still remaining governed by UK law on the ground that the company enjoyed this 
right under its national law, it would have been forced to deny under Art. 48 the same 
right to companies formed in Member States adopting the real seat criteria, on the ground 
that these other companies did not enjoy the same right under their national laws
44
. It had 
thus been submitted that the ECJ conclusion in Daily Mail, despite its contrast with the 
ECJ’s readiness to give full effect to Art. 43 in other areas of the right of establishment  
(such as the right of establishment of individuals) even in the absence of harmonisation 
                                                 
40
 Para. 107 of the ruling 
41
 para. 109-110 of the ruling 
42
 para. 110 of the ruling. 
43
 Loussouarn, Y, “Le droit d’etablissement des societes”, cit; Cerioni, L. “The barriers to the International 
Mobility of Companies within the European Community: A re-reading of the case-law”, Journal of 
Business Law, 1999, pp. 59-79.    
44
 Cerioni, L. “The barriers to the International Mobility of Companies within the European Community: A 
re-reading of the case-law”, cit.,pp. 75- 76. 
measures, had avoided recognising under EC law the disparities created by different 
national company laws
45
.  
    These arguments – in light of the first ECJ conclusion in Cartesio - could be “updated” 
by submitting that, although the ECJ still avoids granting expressly under Art. 48 
different rights to companies according to the rights granted by their national legislators, 
de facto the first conclusion in Cartesio would (continue to) produce exactly this 
(undesirable) result, as it would imply different consequences for companies according to 
the national law of the Member State where they have been set up.  
   Companies created in countries adhering to the real seat theory would be bound to keep 
their central headquarter in the Member State of origin (i.e. in the same Member State of 
location of the registered office) as a condition for existence while being free to exercise 
the outbound freedom of establishment by setting up agencies, branches or subsidiaries in 
other Member States. By contrast, companies created in countries adopting the 
incorporation theory would be free, while keeping the registered office in the State of 
incorporation, to transfer the  central headquarter to other Member States (as allowed by 
their national law of incorporation), in addition to setting up agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries in the host State.  
   The first conclusion in Cartesio, if taken on its own, would mark the “end of the 
history” for the academic debates which, after the ECJ's rulings in Centros, Uberseering, 
Inspire Art and Lasteyrie du Saillant, had been focusing on the issue whether the ECJ's 
Daily Mail ruling could be considered as still applicable and whether the real seat criteria 
had to be regarded as not allowed by EC law. In particular, the Lasteyrie du Saillant 
ruling concerning natural persons, in which the ECJ had struck down exit taxes imposed 
on “taxpayers” (thus, seemingly, on both individuals and companies) wishing to move 
their residence to another Member State, was regarded – by virtue of the fact that Art. 48 
of the Treaty equates companies with natural persons – as applying to companies formed 
in any Member State too
46
. As a result, it was considered as implying the need to give up 
the real seat theory by Member States of origin adopting it until the time of the ruling
47
. 
    The Cartesio ruling, in its first conclusion, clarifies that this is not the case: a Member 
State applying the real seat theory is still free to consider the outbound movement of the 
head office to another Member State as a situation not satisfying the requirement for the 
existence of the company in its jurisdiction, although an intended Member of destination, 
by virtue of the Uberseering ruling, is not free to refuse the inbound movement.   
Because the justification of the real seat criteria, in the Member States adopting it, lies in 
the protection of the interests of the various stakeholders involved (creditors, employees, 
minority shareholders, tax authorities)
48
, the first conclusion of the Cartesio ruling would 
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reveal, if read together with Uberseering, that the state of origin and the state of 
destination are in an opposite position. Specifically, the protection of these interests, 
which can be invoked by a State of destination in certain (exceptional) circumstances to 
restrict the freedom of incoming companies to move the head office into its jurisdiction
49
, 
can normally be invoked by a State of origin (by virtue of the first Cartesio conclusion), 
if this State so wishes, for preventing the outbound movement of the head office.  
    The first part of the ruling seems thus, ex post, to confirm the argument, which was put 
forward after the Centros case by a part of the literature, according to which in that case 
the ECJ did not really intend to assess the consistency of the real seat criteria with EC 
law
50
: the first ECJ’s conclusion in Cartesio implies that, at the current stage of 
development of EC law, the real seat criteria, as a criteria concerning the connecting 
factor which a national legal system is free to adopt, cannot be regarded as inconsistent 
with Art. 48 if applied by the Member State of origin. The asymmetrical position, in 
which States of origin and State of destination find themselves, raises the question 
whether this situation can find any other rationale in addition to the fact that companies 
are creatures of national law.  
    The issue seems to arise because, despite the fact that companies are creatures of 
national law, part of the academic literature, before the Cartesio ruling, found (just like 
the A.G. in Cartesio) a lack of rationale for any distinction between “moving in” and 
“moving out” cases51. This literature argued that, if the State of origin is allowed to 
liquidate companies that transfer their head office or registered office to another Member 
State, the company does not exist any more and those who incorporate a new company in 
the Member State of destination are the former shareholders who would exercise their 
freedom of establishment as individuals, which, in this view, would cause the freedom of 
establishment of companies, granted by Art. 48 of the Treaty, to loose its meaning.  
   Nonetheless, if the distinction between “moving in” and “moving out” cases were 
intended not in the sense of EC law allowing only the “moving in” and leaving the 
“moving out” entirely to national legislators52,  but in the sense of allowing both the 
“moving in” and the “moving out” while attaching certain conditions to the “moving 
out” only, two observations could be formulated. First, if intended in this second 
meaning, the distinction between outbound movement and inbound movement can find a 
rational justification if the stakeholders involved by the company’s business activity 
(creditors, employees, minority shareholders...) are mainly or only concentrated in the 
Member State of departure. Second, this distinction could still avoid rendering Art. 48 
meaningless (from the viewpoint of the freedom of primary establishment) if, despite the 
different treatment of moving out cases and moving in cases, the dissolution of the 
company could still be avoided in cases of moving out.  
   More specifically, in the author’s view, if the interests of stakeholders involved were 
taken into account and a distinction between inbound movement and outbound movement 
was drawn in the sense of establishing certain conditions for the moving out only, there 
                                                 
49
 Case C-208/00, Uberseering, cit., para. 92 
50
 Xanthaki, H., “Centros: is this really the end for the theory of the siege reel?”, Company Lawyer 2001, 
Vol. 22, n.1, pp. 2-8  
51
 Mucciarelli, F.M.  “Company Establishment’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited” 
European Business Organisation Law Review, 2008, 267-303, at 296-298 
52
 Which, as previously stressed, would be the practical outcome of the first ECJ conclusion in Cartesio if 
taken on its own, and is the legal outcome criticized by the literature.      
would be a de facto inconsistency not between moving in and moving out cases, but 
between the different treatment of two different modalities of moving out: on the one 
hand, the intended transfer of the head office (which could lead to liquidation if the 
Member State involved adopts the real seat criteria); on the other hand, the concentration 
of all business activity in a branch located in another Member State (which would be 
allowed) by an already existing company which, until the time of shifting all activity to 
the branch, had operated only in the Member State of origin. This is so because if a 
company, despite formally keeping the central headquarter in the Member States of 
origin, sets up a branch in another Member State and carries on all its activity through 
this branch  (a branch on which the host Member State cannot impose requirements of 
compliance with its own national law, but only the requirements laid down by the 
Eleventh Company Law Directive
53
), the company could in practice achieve the same 
outcome as if it transferred to the host Member State the central headquarter. In fact, in 
this case the branch would be de facto the primary centre of affairs, i.e. it could as a 
matter of fact be the head office (despite being not formally registered as such) due to the 
concentration of the activity there, despite the ECJ has adopted, in Centros and in Inspire 
Art, a formal classification of a registered branch as secondary establishment
54
. Whereas, 
for this reason, the inconsistency which – after Daily Mail and Cartesio - arises between 
the different treatment of two alternative modalities of outbound transfer, in case of a 
Member State adopting the real seat criteria and requiring liquidation of a company 
moving out the formal head office, would be a de facto inconsistency, no legal 
inconsistency could be found if following the ECJ reasoning. By taking the ECJ line of 
reasoning,  it could in fact be noted that the connecting factor with the law of the Member 
State of origin would be broken in case of outbound transfer of the formal head office but 
not in case of creation of a branch in another Member State.        
    As regards the distinction between moving in and moving out cases, the key concern 
about moving out cases should be – in order not to deprive Art. 48 of its scope from the 
perspective of the freedom of primary establishment - how to avoid the dissolution of the 
company and its reincorporation (while indicating the conditions making the “moving 
out” possible).                                                   
     Exactly this concern is addressed by the ECJ’s reasoning on the second issue – i.e., the 
situation of companies wishing to move to another Member State with an attendant 
change of the applicable national law - which reasoning makes available to all companies 
the possibility of outbound seat movement by changing, without dissolution, the 
connecting factor with a Member State. In the ECJ’s wording, in a case in which a 
company governed by the law of one Member State moves to another with an attendant 
change as regards the national law applicable, the company is converted into a form of 
company which is governed by the law of the Member State to which it has moved. In 
this case, the power of the Member State of origin to define the connecting factor required 
of a company incorporated in its jurisdiction and wishing to maintain its status, “….far 
from implying that national legislation on the incorporation and winding-up of companies 
enjoys any form of immunity from the rules of the EC Treaty on freedom of 
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establishment, cannot, in particular, justify the Member State of incorporation, by 
requiring the winding up or liquidation of the company, in preventing that company from 
converting itself into a company governed by the law of the other Member State, to the 
extent that it is permitted under that law to do so” 55. 
    As it was noted
56
, the AG dealt with an issue – the transfer of the head office alone – 
which, due to confusion in the legal terminology, was different from the question actually 
raised by the company, which used to refer to the transfer of the “seat”. Cartesio was 
thus, apparently, interested in transferring both the registered office and the head office 
while maintaining its status as an entity governed by Hungarian law. Nonetheless, the 
ECJ’s statement cited just above clarifies that at the current stage EC law does not confer 
companies a right to transfer the registered office and the head office while remaining 
governed by the law of the State of incorporation, but confers companies the right to 
transfer the registered and the head office (without dissolution) only with a change of the 
applicable national law.  Cartesio indicates therefore that the Daily Mail conclusion – 
while still applicable if the company wishes to maintain the connecting factor with the 
Member State of incorporation while no longer complying with the underlying conditions 
– no longer applies in case of a seat transfer complying with the condition of converting 
the legal form (without dissolution).   
    The last part (“to the extent that it is permitted under that law to do so”) turns out being 
the decisive one. Taken on its own, it indicates that the possibility of cross-border seat 
transfer without winding up of the company ultimately depends on the law of the State of 
destination. If the legal system of the State of destination allows the inbound movement 
of both the registered office and the real seat of a company formed in another EC 
jurisdiction without requiring a new process of incorporation but merely the conversion 
into the new legal form, the State of origin cannot prevent the transfer
57
. In fact, in the 
case under consideration, the transfer amounts not to an infringement of the conditions 
required by the law of the State of incorporation by a company wishing to maintaining its 
connecting factor with this State, but to a choice of the company – as an entity distinct 
from its shareholders - to change its connecting factor, i.e. to establish a new connecting 
factor with another Member State. By stating that the prevention of the actual conversion 
into a company governed by the law of the Member State of destination constitutes a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment of the company concerned which, unless it 
serves overriding requirements in the public interest, is prohibited under Art. 43
58
, the 
ECJ’s reasoning clarifies that exactly the choice of a company to change its connecting 
factor with a Member State is protected by the Treaty’s provisions on the right of 
establishment and that, at the current state of EC law, companies enjoy a right of primary 
establishment under this form of seat transfer.  
    The second ECJ’s conclusion can thus be seen as specifying that a Member State’s 
power to determine “life and death” of a company incorporated under its legislation no 
longer exists where this company aims at changing the applicable national law.   
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     In addition, the ECJ strengthened its overall conclusions about the difference between 
the case of a company wishing to move its head office while retaining its status under the 
law of the State of incorporation and the case of a company wishing to move the 
registered office with a change of the applicable national law by dealing with 
Commission’s argument and by drawing a distinction with the SEVIC ruling. 
     The Commission had maintained that the absence of EC legislation aimed at 
harmonising the connecting factors required by national legislations was remedied by the 
rules on the forms of business organisation introduced by the European Community.  
These forms, i.e. the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)
59
, the European 
company (Societas Europaea, SE)
60
 and the European Cooperative Society
61
, are to a 
good extent governed by uniform EC law as regards their core features, but these EC 
provisions leave several aspects to the national law of the Member State of registration. 
Specific provisions of the respective Regulations allow such entities to transfer both the 
registered office and the head office with a change of this applicable national law, and the 
Commission argued that such rules should be applied to the cross-border transfer of real 
seat of a company incorporated under the law of a Member State.  Arguably, the 
Commission’s view that such rules are applicable mutatis mutandis to the transfer of 
registered office and real seat of companies governed by national law is consistent with 
its assessment that a Directive on the transfer of the registered office of companies from 
one Member State to another is unnecessary at the current time.  
  In response, the ECJ simply highlighted that, even if the application of the rules on the 
seat transfer of the EEIG and of the SE concerning the seat transfer with a change of 
applicable law were to govern the cross-border seat transfer of a company incorporated 
under national law,  the fact that Cartesio merely wished to transfer its seat without 
changing the national law implies that these rules on seat transfer contained in the EEIG 
regulation and in the SE could not lead to the predicted result (of allowing the transfer) in 
the circumstances at stake in the Cartesio case
62
. The specification even if these rules 
“were to govern” impliedly indicates that, in the ECJ’s view, the rules on the seat transfer 
of the EEIG and of the SE are actually intended to govern only these EC law vehicles 
(whose regulation is in some respects left to national laws) rather than companies 
governed by national laws. The rules applying to these vehicles currently require the 
registered office and the head office to be in the same State
63
. Because they would not 
seem, on the basis of the ECJ’s wording in Cartesio, to apply to companies governed by 
national law, and since this wording emphasizes the conversion of the company into a 
form governed by the law of the State of destination, which requires the registered office 
to move to this State, the ruling would seem to leave the doubt as to whether – in addition 
to the transfer of both the registered office and the head office – the transfer of the 
registered office alone would be allowed and, if so, in what cases
64
. 
    In the second respect – i.e., the distinction between the facts at stake in Daily Mail and 
in Cartesio, and the implications of the SEVIC ruling – the ECJ explained that SEVIC  
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does not relate to the same problem. The difference in the underlying issue would be that, 
whereas in Daily Mail and Cartesio the issue at stake is the existence itself of the 
company under the national law of the State of origin and thus its entitlement to the right 
of establishment, in the situations in Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art and SEVIC  the 
issue was a possible restriction, in the Member State of destination, of the right of 
establishment of companies whose existence under the national law of incorporation is 
not called into question
65
. 
   All these ECJ arguments in Cartesio give rise to new issues for the potential 
developments of EC company law.                        
   
3. Assessment of potential effects: key issues 
 
   As noted above, the ECJ, by specifying that the Member State of origin cannot prevent 
a company formed under its national law from transferring its seat to another Member 
State (without dissolution and) with a change of the applicable national law, to the extent 
that the law of the intended State of destination allows the inbound movement, seems to 
have left decisive choices to the State of destination.  
    In the author’s view, this ECJ position and the fact that, seemingly, the rules on the 
seat transfer laid down for the SE and the EEIG do not apply to companies governed by 
national laws
66
,  raise important issues: a) whether a Directive on the cross-border seat 
transfer would be necessary and, if so, for which purpose; b)  in what case restrictions by 
a State of origin could be justified by overriding requirements in the public interest; c)  
whether a Convention between Member States would be necessary; d) any potential 
impact of Cartesio  on the supranational company law forms. 
   
3.1. The need for a Directive on the cross-border seat transfer  
 
    The Commission, in its impact assessment on a Directive on the cross-border transfer 
of registered office
67
, carried out an assessment of the need for protection, and of the 
safeguards either to be considered as existing or to be introduced, for each of the different 
categories of stakeholders. This Commission’s assessment – which focused on the 
transfer of the registered office with a change of applicable law -  identified the potential 
risks for stakeholders and stressed that, whereas in some areas the safeguards would be 
ensured by the EC legislation already enacted,  in other areas further safeguards would be 
needed., but it concluded that it was not clear that adopting a Directive would represent 
the least onerous way of achieving the objectives set
68
, and that therefore a Directive on 
the cross-border transfer was not needed at the current time
69
.  The Commission was 
induced to draw this conclusion, inter alia, by the belief that the issue of the transfer of 
the registered office might be clarified by the ECJ in the Cartesio ruling still pending at 
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the time
70
.   
   Having the Commission reached such conclusion before the ECJ’s ruling in Cartesio, 
the question arises whether the ECJ’s conclusion makes the Directive necessary to avoid 
a situation in which, within the internal market, companies could move their seat only to 
some States and not to others. The European Parliament, on 10 March 2009, adopted a 
resolution
71
 recommending the Commission to put forward a Directive on the cross-
border transfer of the registered office of a company, but this resolution does not mention 
the Cartesio ruling. Interestingly, the resolution invites the Commission to propose a 
Directive in order to facilitate the cross-border transfer of the registered office, but notes 
that “undertakings can currently transfer their set only either by dissolution and 
establishment of a new legal entity in the Member State of destination, or by establishing 
a new legal entity in the Member State of destination and then merging both 
undertakings; further notes that this procedure involves administrative obstacles, costs 
and social consequences and offers no legal certainty”72 . The European Parliament  
therefore considers the dissolution and the reincorporation ex novo in the State of 
destination, and the cross-border merger with a newly established company, as the two 
existing modalities of seat transfer: in this sense,  the facilitation of the cross-border 
transfer of the registered office that would be brought about by the Directive consists of 
the addition, as a new modality of seat transfer, of the outright transfer of registered 
office without dissolution and without need for a merger. In other words, the European 
Parliament uses the verb “facilitate” not in the sense of making it easier a form of transfer 
that is already possible, but in the sense of making it legally possible a form of transfer 
which is not yet possible. On a first reading, the ECJ’s conclusion in Cartesio, by 
specifying that the outright seat transfer  with a change of the applicable national law is 
possible to the extent that it is “permitted” by the law of the State of destination, would 
seem to imply that a Directive is necessary to ensure that any Member State permits the 
inbound transfer. If this were the case, a Directive would thus serve to make it legally 
possible – as intended by the European Parliament – the direct seat transfer (without 
dissolution and without the need for a merger) as a modality of exercise of the freedom of 
establishment throughout the Community.  
     This purpose of the intended Directive would, however, be inconsistent with the 
clarification by the ECJ, in  SEVIC, that the freedom of establishment is unconditional 
and that EC harmonisation rules cannot be made a precondition for the implementation of 
the freedom of establishment
73
 . Although SEVIC has been regarded by the ECJ, in 
Cartesio, to be a case of inbound movement, the circumstance that the Cartesio ruling has 
specified that, subject to the change of applicable national law, the outbound movement 
is possible too, makes the ECJ’s reasoning in SEVIC also applicable to the outbound seat 
transfer. To put it differently, despite in Cartesio issues concerning a possible Directive 
on the seat transfer were not raised, the ECJ’s reasoning in SEVIC as regards the cross-
border merger directive seems to be applicable mutatis mutandis. In particular, in SEVIC, 
                                                 
70
 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact assessment on the Directive on the cross-border transfer 
of registered office, SEC(2007)1707, 12 December 2007, p. 25.  
 
71
 European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2009 with recommendations to the Commission on the 
cross-border transfer of the registered office of a company (2008/2196(INI)). 
72
 Ibid, paragraph 1 and 2 of the resolution.  
73
 Case C-411/03, SEVIC, cit, para. 24 to 31 
where it had classified cross-border mergers as one of the possible forms of exercise of 
the freedom of establishment, the ECJ had made it evident that a Directive on cross-
border merger could serve to facilitate this form of exercise of the right of establishment, 
which, irrespective of the existence of a specific Directive, has to be seen as allowed due 
to the unconditional nature of the rights conferred by Arts. 43 and 48. Moreover, the ECJ 
had found that Arts. 43 and 48 cover all measures that permit or even merely facilitate 
access to another Member State by participating in the economic life of the country 
effectively and under the same conditions as national operators
74
. Undoubtedly, the cross-
border seat transfer, at least when consisting of a transfer of the registered office together 
the head office-principal place of business, can be as effective as the cross-border merger 
in permitting or facilitating the access to another Member State, i.e. in allowing the 
participation in the economic life of the country of destination.    
    Accordingly, it would be inconsistent to consider one form of exercise of the right of 
establishment, such as cross-border merger, as allowed irrespective of the specific 
Directive (i.e., as unconditional) and another form of exercise of the right of 
establishment, i.e. the cross-border seat transfer (without dissolution and) with a change 
of applicable national law as allowed provided that a specific Directive is issued (i.e. as 
conditional on the existence of a specific Directive). The freedom of establishment being 
unconditional irrespective of its modality of exercise, the logical argument would be that 
a Directive on the transfer of the registered and head office with a change of applicable 
national law should only serve to facilitate this direct seat transfer in the sense of making 
it easier, to the same extent as the Directive on cross-border mergers
75
, in light of the 
SEVIC ruling, only serves to make cross-border mergers easier.  
   Consequently, if as a result of the ECJ’s literal wording in Cartesio (“..to the extent that 
it is permitted..”) a Directive was regarded as necessary to make the cross-border seat 
transfer legally possible as a modality of exercise of the freedom of establishment, it 
would become problematic to reconcile this wording with the above ECJ's general 
statements in SEVIC.   
    Nonetheless, an interpretation capable of translating the logical argument into a legal 
one is possible if the ECJ's specification that the outbound transfer falls under the 
freedom of establishment “to the extent that it is permitted under the law” of the State of 
destination is read again together with the ECJ's conclusion in the Uberseering ruling. In 
Uberseering, the ECJ had stated that a State A, in whose territory a company formed 
under the law of a State B has moved the head office while remaining governed by the 
law of State B, cannot refuse to recognise the company's legal capacity, as such a refusal 
would amount to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment
76
. 
     In reaching this conclusion, the ECJ had however admitted that measures restricting 
the freedom of establishment could be taken by a Member State for overriding reasons of 
public interest, such as the protection of the interests of creditors, of employees, of tax 
authorities
77
. On the other hand, it had clarified that the refusal to recognise the legal 
capacity – which amounts to a refusal to allow the incoming seat transfer without 
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reconstitution of the company – goes beyond what was necessary to achieve the 
protection of those interests as it would be an outright negation of the freedom of 
establishment
78
 and would thus be in breach of Arts. 43 and 48.     
    By taking this reasoning together with the Cartesio findings, it can be inferred that, if a 
State of destination cannot refuse to allow the inbound seat transfer in the event that the 
company wishes to remain governed by the law of the State of origin
79
, to an even greater 
extent the State of destination cannot refuse the inbound seat transfer if the company 
intends to change the applicable national law and to become subject to the national 
legislation of this State. The ultimate outcome would otherwise be again the outright 
negation of the freedom of establishment, with the absolute freedom of the State of origin 
to prevent the transfer whenever the intended State of destination does not allow the 
inbound seat transfer into its jurisdiction. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the State of 
destination, the risks for third parties' interests are certainly lower when the incoming 
company wishes to become subject to its national law.                            
   Accordingly, it can be argued – by reading together Cartesio and Uberseering - that the 
State of destination must accept the incoming seat movement, but can have discretion 
only as regards the steps to be taken by the incoming company for changing the 
applicable law. The ECJ's statement in Cartesio (“to the extent that it is permitted by the 
law of this latter State”) can thus be read as meaning that the Member State of origin 
cannot prevent the outbound seat transfer of a company with a change of the applicable 
national law, to the extent that the company takes all the steps required, for this purpose, 
by the law of the State of destination.      
   If accepting this reading, the conclusion would be that, following the Cartesio ruling,  a 
Directive on the cross-border transfer of seat would be needed only to facilitate the 
transfer (just like the Directive on cross-border merger could only be intended,   
following the SEVIC ruling, to facilitate cross-border mergers). The Directive would do 
so by harmonising the steps required for this purpose by the different Member States to 
incoming companies.     
   This raises the question whether the draft proposal for the 14
th
 Company Law Directive,  
in the last version which was put forward before the Commission's conclusion that this 
Directive was not needed and thus before the Cartesio ruling, and the recommendations 
of the European Parliament which set out the same procedure, would be adequate for this 
purpose. This procedure for the transfer - preparation and publication of a transfer 
proposal, approval of the transfer proposal by shareholders and creditors, etc.. - is similar 
to the procedure set out in Regulation 2157/2001 (the European Company Statute) for the 
seat transfer of a SE and to the procedures indicated by the Directives dealing with 
mergers
80
.  The procedure mainly seeks to harmonise the steps to be taken in the State of 
departure; therefore, it clearly reflects a concern for the protection of stakeholders in that 
State. As regards the steps to be taken in the State of destination, the recommended 
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procedure only indicates that: a certificate conclusively declaring that all acts and 
formalities required have been completed, issued by the Member State of origin, should 
be presented within an appropriate period of time to the body responsible for registration 
in the Member State of destination, together with a copy of the memorandum, of the 
article of association envisaged for the company in this latter Member State and of the 
transfer proposal;  these documents should suffice to enable the company to register in 
the Member State of destination; the competent authority in this State must verify that the 
substantive and formal conditions for the transfer are met and give immediate notification 
of the registration to the authority of the Member State of origin
81
.     
   These recommendations, if they were to result in a Directive, would  be  detailed and 
specific (leaving virtually no discretion) for the State of origin, but it would still leave 
wide discretion to the Member State of destination as regards the steps to be taken in that 
State. Specifically, the Member State of destination would seem free to decide: a) what is 
the “appropriate period of time” for the presentation of the documents to the its 
competent authority; b) whether the registration should take place immediately upon 
presentation of the documents above indicated or whether, before registration, the 
competent authority should verify if the clauses of the articles and memorandum of 
association comply with any requirement which might exist in relation to the new chosen 
legal form
82
; c) whether the incoming company should wait until the new legal form has 
been adopted  (and entered into the commercial register) to identify itself with the tax 
authorities in the new State or whether should do so before registration
83
.  
      Consequently, a Directive intended to prevent the persistence of considerable 
differences between the Member States in these important aspects should go further than 
the draft 14
th
 Directive and the European Parliament recommendation, i.e. it should   
indicate in detail not only the procedural steps required in the Member State of origin, but 
the conditions to be met in the Member State of destination too.  This would be necessary 
for creating a level playing field for cross-border mobility of companies within the 
European Community. Complying with the conditions that may be requested in the new 
Member State, and ensuring uniformity of all these conditions from one Member State to 
another, would in fact guarantee that the Member State of origin could not hinder the 
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transfer (whichever the Member State of destination will be), but could only ensure that 
the appropriate procedural steps for the protection of stakeholders in the Member State of 
origin
84
 will be complied with. 
    
3.2. Possibility of restrictions by a State of origin on grounds of overriding requirements 
in the public interest 
 
   In the ECJ's statement whereby the prevention of the actual conversion into a company 
governed by the law of the State of destination constitutes a restriction in breach of the 
Treaty's articles on the freedom of establishment, the specification “unless it serves  
overriding requirements in the public interest”85, appears particularly significant.  On the 
one hand, it indirectly confirms that the seat transfer with the actual conversion into a 
form governed by the law of the State of destination cannot be subject to the existence of 
a Directive, i.e. that a Directive could only be intended to facilitate it rather than to make 
it legally possible. On the other hand, it shows the importance of the overriding 
requirements concerning stakeholders' protection in the State of origin, and gives rise to 
the question whether, in case of introduction of a Directive setting out (as the proposed 
draft and the European Parliament recommendation do) procedural phases in this State, 
exactly for the purpose of ensuring this protection, the prevention of the seat transfer 
with conversion by the State of origin on grounds of overriding requirements of public 
interests is still possible. If this part of the Cartesio ruling is red together with the ECJ's 
statement in Uberseering and in SEVIC whereby the overriding requirements in the 
public interest relate to the protection of creditors, employees, minority shareholders or 
tax authorities
86
, it could be inferred that the ECJ in Cartesio refers to the same 
categories: however, the provisions of the Directive at stake, in setting out the procedure 
for the transfer, would aim at ensuring exactly this protection.   
   In this respect, it can be noted that the European Parliament resolution recommending 
the Directive, in its preamble, expressly states that “the cross-border transfer of the 
registered office should not circumvent legal, social and fiscal conditions”87 and that “the 
right of other stakeholders concerned by the transfer, such as minority shareholders, 
employees and creditors etc, should be safeguarded”88.        
   In other words, if the compliance in the State of departure with all procedural steps set 
out by the possible Directive under consideration was regarded as always satisfying all 
requirements of stakeholders' protection, the ECJ's specification “unless it serves 
overriding requirements” (meaning that the freedom of outbound transfer can be 
restricted if there are overriding requirements of general interest) would no longer make 
sense after the introduction of the Directive. On the contrary, if the compliance with the 
procedural steps set out by the Directive were considered to be necessary for 
stakeholders' protection but not always sufficient for this purpose, the Member State of 
origin would be left some discretion in assessing when the outbound transfer could be 
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subject to further restriction due to overriding requirements.  
     In the author’s view,   both cases when the compliance with the procedural steps laid 
down by the possible Directive may be necessary and sufficient for stakeholders’ 
protection and cases when this compliance might not be sufficient could occur. This 
realization would seem to derive on the one hand from the modalities of transfer of 
registered office that, on the basis of the European Parliament resolution, would be 
allowed by the Directive, and, on the other hand, from a co-ordinated reading of the 
Cartesio ruling with the SEVIC and Cadbury Schweppes rulings.       
    Specifically, the Directive, if based on the European Parliament recommendations, 
would clearly govern both the transfer of the registered office together with the head 
office and the transfer of the registered office alone (in both cases with the change of the 
applicable national law): the resolution states in fact that a rule requiring a company to 
maintain its head office and its registered office in the same Member State would run 
counter to ECJ’s case-law89.  The resolution refers to the case-law before the Cartesio 
ruling: because the ECJ’s wording in Cartesio would seem to leave the doubt as to 
whether – in addition to the transfer of both the registered office and the head office – the 
transfer of the registered office alone would be allowed under Art. 43 and 48 and, if so, in 
what cases
90
, in the author’s view the solution to this issue and the identification of cases 
when a Directive might not be considered as sufficient for stakeholders’ protection are 
interconnected, and depend on the interpretation of the statement “unless it serves 
overriding requirements in the public interest” in Cartesio. It is proposed here that this 
statement should be read together with the ECJ’s findings, in SEVIC and Cadbury 
Schweppes, that the provisions on freedom of establishment protect the effective 
participation in the economic life of the host Member State, i.e. a genuine economic 
integration in the host Member State
91
.  
     A transfer of the registered office together with the head office could arguably relate 
to a concentration of the business activity (mainly) in the Member State of destination 
and thus result in a genuine economic integration in that Member State. The application 
of the new legislation would thus not serve to circumvent the legislation of the Member 
State of origin. Because the situations in which stakeholders’ protection risks being 
jeopardized are obviously those in which a company intends to circumvent a national 
legislation that is aimed at ensuring this protection, in a case of genuine economic 
integration in the State of destination, lacking the intention to circumvent the legislation 
of the Member State of origin, stakeholders’ interests should reasonably be regarded – 
unless particular circumstances of the concrete case suggest otherwise - as protected by 
the arrangements that would be laid down by the Directive
92
.   
    By contrast, a transfer of the registered office alone could give rise to some doubts 
about whether or not there would be genuine economic integration in the intended State 
of destination if all the business activity, together with the head office, remained 
concentrated in the Member State of origin.  In such a case, this latter State should 
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arguably be left some discretion in assessing the outbound transfer. If the transfer was 
aimed (due to the change of applicable law) at circumventing national provisions 
protecting the stakeholders and if, to avoid this circumvention, the arrangements laid 
down by the Directive would not suffice, the prevention of the outbound transfer of the 
registered office alone for overriding requirements in the public interest would arguably 
be allowed by the Cartesio ruling, subject to the condition that no less restrictive means
93
 
exist to prevent the circumvention and to ensure stakeholders’ protection. Such an 
interpretation seems to be capable of reconciling the Cartesio statement concerning the 
overriding requirement in the public interest with the purpose of the freedom of 
establishment provisions as specified by the ECJ in SEVIC and Cadbury Schweppes. 
    In cases where the intention in terms of economic integration in the host Member State 
seems to be doubtful, which may occur especially in the event of transfer of the registered 
office alone, the purpose of a Directive which would aim at facilitating the cross-border 
seat transfer with the change of applicable national law would in fact need to be balanced 
against the need for assessment as to whether the operation is consistent with the purpose 
of the freedom of establishment. To achieve this balance would be the challenge for any 
future ECJ ruling dealing with cross-border seat transfer after the introduction of the 
Directive. 
  
3.3. A possible Convention between Member States  
 
     Thirdly, the question also arises whether Cartesio makes no longer necessary the 
negotiations between Member States under Art. 293 of the Treaty. Article 293 commits 
Member States to enter into negotiations, to the necessary extent, for securing the mutual 
recognition of companies and the retention of the legal personality in the event of seat 
transfer from one Member State to another. In the Daily Mail ruling, the ECJ had  
considered the differences as between the connecting factors as problems “which are not 
resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment, but which must be dealt with 
by future legislation or conventions”94, and in Cartesio, in elaborating its reasoning, it 
made reference to this part of the Daily Mail ruling.  In consequence, it could be argued 
that, if after Daily Mail a multilateral Convention had been entered into between all 
Member States for the purpose of securing the mutual recognition of companies and the 
retention of legal personality in the event of seat transfer, the ECJ conclusion in Cartesio 
would have been different. Nonetheless, it must be noted that, before Cartesio, the 
ECJ’conclusion in Uberseering had already ensured the two objectives indicated by Art. 
293 from the viewpoint of the Member State of destination, and that Cartesio specifies 
the condition under which the retention of the legal personality is ensured, under EC law, 
from the viewpoint of the State of departure too. Whereas the drafters of Art. 293 did not 
distinguish between retention of the legal personality and retention of the legal form, 
Cartesio ensures the retention of the legal personality (intended as continuing existence 
of the company) without the retention of the legal form chosen under the law of the 
Member State of origin, which legal form must be converted into the legal form offered 
by the Member State of destination. As a result, if one assumes that, by “legal 
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personality”, the drafters of Art. 293 simply meant the separate legal existence of the 
company as a corporate entity, irrespective of the specific legal form (e.g., either private 
or public limited company), after Cartesio a Convention between Member States aimed 
at ensuring the retention of legal personality is no longer necessary. In the author’s view, 
what could be necessary  – especially if the Directive on cross-border seat transfer were 
not adopted – is a Convention aimed at agreeing the procedural steps that, both in the 
State of origin and in the State of destination, will need to be taken by the company 
(irrespective of the States from which and to which it wishes to move).  
 
3.4. Potential impact on the European Company and the proposed European Private 
Company  
 
    If the transfer of the registered office without the transfer of the head office is to be 
regarded as allowed for companies governed by national laws, although subject to the 
assessment in light of the need for stakeholders’ protection95, the obligation imposed by 
the current version of the European Company Statute, on SEs, to transfer the registered 
office together with the head office
96
 would need to be abolished during the forthcoming 
revision of the Regulation
97
, in order not to place the SE at a disadvantage in comparison 
with companies governed by national law.  By contrast, the current version of the 
proposal for a European Private Company (EPC)
98
  - which would allow a company to 
have the registered office and the head office in two different Member States
99
 – does not 
seem, in the author’s view, to be affected by the Cartesio ruling.  
    This would hold true for two reasons (in addition to the fact that a EPC would have no 
obligation to keep registered office and head office in the same State). First, the EPC  
would be a  “creature of EC law”, governed by uniform EC law to a much wider extent 
than the SE
100
, so that – to apply mutatis mutandis the ECJ’s reasoning in Daily Mail 
(which was uphold in the first part of the Cartesio ruling) – it is for EC law to govern the 
condition for its existence and functioning. 
    Second, the procedure for the transfer of the registered office of both the SE and the 
proposed EPC, which specify various phases aimed at protecting stakeholders in the State 
of departure and – particularly in the case of the proposed EPC – indicates the obligations 
on the authorities of the State of destination
101
, could remain unaffected again because of 
the fact that the legal form would not be altered by the transfer. The maintaining of the 
legal form would of course avoid leaving the authorities of the State of destination the 
same margins of discretion that they would have in case of companies governed by 
national law wishing to convert the legal form.  In effect, the provision of the proposed 
EPC Regulation relating to the seat transfer clarify that the substantive and formal 
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requirements laid down in the relevant Chapter
102
 already indicate all conditions to be 
fulfilled
103
.  Pending the revision of the European Company Statute, if the EPC were 
introduced according to the current proposal it would thus be, after the Cartesio ruling,  
the only legal form allowing businesses to transfer either the registered office together 
with the head office or the head office alone or the registered office alone.        
    
 
4. Conclusion 
     
    Cartesio can certainly be seen as a landmark ruling for companies’ migration 
throughout the European Community because, for the first time, the ECJ has expressly 
identified the content of the freedom of primary establishment, covered by Articles 43 
and 48, which companies created in any Member State can enjoy.  
     After this ruling, the legal environment within the European Community indicates 
three possible situations as regard the cross-border seat transfer: a) transfer of the head 
office alone without the transfer of the registered office; b) transfer of the registered 
office alone without the transfer of the head office, and without a change of the 
applicable national law; c) transfer of the registered office, either alone or with the head 
office, with a change of the applicable national law.  
     Whereas in the situations in a) and b) the possibility for companies to implement such 
modalities of transfer would entirely depend on the national laws of their Member States 
of incorporation, the situation in c) would be the only one falling within Art. 48, and 
which would thus be possible for companies created in whatever Member State (but 
would be subject, particularly in case of transfer of the registered office alone, to the 
assessment of its compatibility with overriding requirement in the public interest).  
   This would be so because, irrespective of the Member State to which companies wishes 
to move the head office with a conversion of the legal form, the host Member State 
cannot refuse the incoming transfer and cannot require the reincorporation ex novo under 
its legislation, but can only indicate the fulfillments to be complied with for the 
conversion of the legal form. 
     Taking into consideration the A.G. opinion whereby the previous ECJ case-law 
indicated that neither the incorporation theory nor the real seat theory could be applied to 
the fullest possible extent, it could be argued that in the Cartesio ruling – without sharing  
the final recommendation of the A.G. – the ECJ has actually indicated that under EC law 
neither the incorporation system nor the real system apply as regards the cross-border 
mobility of companies.  In fact, the possibility of transfer of the registered office without 
the head office and with a change of applicable national law would be a situation which, 
from the viewpoint of the Member State of “departure”, would be allowed neither by 
Member States adopting the incorporation system nor by Member States adopting the real 
seat system
104
. In other words, the ECJ conclusion in Cartesio shows that, until 
legislation at EC level will be introduced to approximate the connecting factors required 
by Member States for companies formed in their jurisdictions, under Article 48 only what 
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could be defined as “conversion system” applies regarding the cross-border seat transfer 
of companies governed by national law. To draw the comparison with natural persons, 
the difference could be highlighted in these terms: whereas natural persons, once they 
have acquired the nationality of a Member State, get the right under EC law to emigrate 
to other Member States without changing the nationality, companies governed by 
national law, once created in accordance with the law of a Member State, acquire under 
EC law the right to “change the nationality” by means of a transfer with a change of the 
applicable national law.  Because the “change of nationality” of the company, by means 
of the conversion of the legal form (from a form allowed by the law of the State of origin 
to a form allowed by the law of the destination State), actually needs to be carried out by 
the members of the company, one might take the perspective of the company’s 
founders
105
 and question whether the freedom of establishment allowed by Cartesio is the 
freedom of establishment of natural persons who are members of the company rather than 
freedom of establishment of the company itself as a legal entity. Nonetheless, in this 
author’s view,  the freedom of establishment available by means of the seat transfer with 
change of the legal form must still be considered as freedom of  establishment of the 
company, for two reasons. First, the company as a separate legal entity is not dissolved; 
second, the freedom of primary establishment of individuals, under Art. 43, consists of 
the freedom to set up and manage undertakings in the host Member State after the 
migration there, whereas in the case of seat transfer with conversion of the legal form, the 
company has already been set up in the State of origin before the seat transfer.       
   Moreover, if a Directive on the cross-border seat transfer for companies governed by 
national laws were not issued before the introduction of the proposed EPC
106
, the 
possibilities offered by this latter in terms of seat transfer would be likely to allow this 
form to successfully compete with legal forms governed by national laws in the choices 
of SMEs throughout the European Community. The same argument could obviously 
apply to the SE in the choice of larger enterprises, if the revision of the European 
Company Statute will manage to reduce the margins for national laws. 
    A conclusive reflection seems therefore to be necessary. After the opinion of the A.G. 
in Cartesio, and in the wait of the ECJ ruling, the Hungarian literature noted that the 
amendments of Hungarian law after the time of the Cartesio proceedings had all 
produced the result of making the national company regime more attractive: freedom of 
Hungarian-registered business organizations to transfer head office to other Member 
States, while remaining registered in Hungary, since 1 September 2007; reduction of the 
minimum capital required for registration, since that time; registration within a term of as 
much as one hour, since 1 July 2008
107
. This literature thus argued that the Hungarian 
company law (by making Hungary attractive for the registration of companies which are 
then be free to have their head offices in other Member States) would imply effects of 
regulatory competition that can be seen as harmful in other Member States
108
, and that, 
because an interpretation of the freedom of establishment such as the one advocated by 
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the AG in Cartesio may contribute to the acceleration of this regulatory competition 
which would be not necessarily welcome in various Member States, the ECJ would be 
careful in considering whether to follow the A.G. opinion
109
. Taking these arguments into 
consideration, it can ex post be concluded that the ECJ, by not following the A.G. 
opinion, may have avoided accelerating a regulatory competition between legal forms 
governed by national company laws, but may have paved the way for a regulatory 
competition between national legal forms and legal forms mostly governed by European 
law. In the author’s view, this latter competition should however be welcome, due to the 
fact that, if successful in this competition, the revised European Company statute and the 
proposed EPC would eventually manage or better manage to fulfill their own role as 
vehicles aimed at helping businesses of any Member State to benefit from all 
opportunities offered by the EC internal market.                       
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